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Punishment, Proportionality, and
Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent
Offenders:
A Test of the Leniency Gap Hypothesis

Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan, and Akiva Liberman*
In the past two decades, nearly every state has expanded its authority and simplified its
procedures to transfer adolescent offenders from juvenile to criminal (adult) courts. As a result,
the use of jurisdictionaltransfer has grown steadily. These developments reflect popular and
political concerns that punishment in juvenile courts is too lenientfor serious crimes committed
by adolescents. Yet there is mixed evidence that expanded transfer authority has produced more
certain or severe punishments for adolescents prosecuted in criminal courts. Some empirical
studies show that adolescents transferred to criminal court are more likely to be convicted,
sentenced to prison, and serve longer sentences compared to similar cases that remain in the
juvenile court. Other studies show that transferredcases receive similarsentences or receive less
severe punishments. In this Article, we report the results of a natural experiment comparing
detention, disposition, and custodialsentence lengths for matched groups of adolescents charged
with seriousfelony offenses in juvenile or criminal courts. We find that adolescents prosecuted
as adults are at a greater risk of detention and incarcerationand, if incarcerated,are sentenced
to longer sentences than adolescents in juvenile courts. Yet the disparity between outcomes in
juvenile and criminal courts may not be as large as the rhetoric surrounding this issue would
lead one to believe. The resilience of the common law doctrine of diminished culpability of
adolescents is evident in the limited effects of expanded jurisdictional transfer activity on
sentencing and punishment of adolescents in criminal court. Denying adolescents the latitude of
a traditionally more rehabilitative and lenient juvenile court indeed results in more severe
punishments; however, this jurisdictionalshift also creates the opportunity for organizational
and discretionary adaptations to case processing that might contradict popular efforts to
criminal adolescent offenders.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For over two decades, legislatures across the nation have enacted a variety of laws and
policies to criminalize delinquency by relocating adolescent offenders from the juvenile to the
adult court.' More recently, the U.S. Senate passed legislation to "get tough" on juvenile crime
.
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1 Keith Bradsher, Fearof Crime Trumps Fear of Lost Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1999, at 3. See generally Jeffrey
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by promoting the transfer of adolescents to criminal court, and providing funds to facilitate state
efforts to do the same.2 This legislation threatens to accelerate a trend that began with the passage
of New York State's Juvenile Offender Law in 19783 and continues today even as juvenile crime
rates have fallen dramatically. 4 Since 1990, nearly every state and the federal system have
expanded the use of adult adjudication and punishment for adolescent offenders.5 Some states
have expanded the number of cases eligible for judicial waiver, and still others have reassigned
the burden of proof for waiver hearings from the prosecutor (seeking to waive a case to criminal
court) to the defense counsel (seeking to deny waiver).6 Some state legislatures have excluded
specific offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.
Other states permit prosecutorial choice of
7
forum between concurrent jurisdictions.
California's recent enactment of the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention.Act, or
Proposition 21,8 is typical of both the statutory shifts in the boundary between juvenile and
criminal court and the procedural changes by which cases cross this boundary. Proposition 21
allows for increased use of transfer to criminal court and greater prosecutorial control over this
practice. Enacted through a voter initiative in March 2000, this law lowered the age of eligibility
for transfer to criminal court from sixteen to fourteen. It also shifted discretion from judges, who
would previously conduct an investigation to determine if the defendant was amenable to
treatment in juvenile court, to prosecutors, who can now directly file cases in criminal court if
they meet certain criteria.9 Proponents of this initiative claim that it has been made necessary by
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring, Editors' Introduction to CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 1-10 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter CHANGING
BORDERS] (arguing that the seemingly procedural decision to waive juvenile proceedings for adult court actually
comprises a multitude of social attitudes and political considerations).
2
Both political parties introduced nearly identical legislation in the 106th Congress that would broaden the
categories of juvenile offenses and offenders eligible for transfer to the criminal court. Violent and Repeat Juvenile
Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, S. 254, 106th Cong. §§ 301(103)(13), 302(222)(a)(10)(B),
321(1801)(a), 321(1801)(b)(1)(A), 321(1801)(c)(1) 321(1803)(b)(2), 321(1803)(c)(2)(B) (1999). This bill calls for
"graduated sanctions" that would require punishment "that reflect[s] ... the severity or repeated nature" of juvenile
crimes. Id. § 301(103)(13). The bill provides fiscal incentives to the states, via block grants, to implement these
provisions. Id. § 321(222)(a)(21).
1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478 § 2; see SIMON SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY 46-74 (1996). Legislative
distrust of juvenile justice officials prompted passage of the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, an excluded-offense waiver
provision that places certain categories of violent offenses automatically in criminal court. See infra note 37.
See generally HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL
REPORT 93 (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html (showing falling crime
rates).
5 See Juan Alberto Arteaga, Juvenile InJustice: Congressional Attempts To Abrogate The Procedural Rights Of
Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051 (2002) (discussing federal policy towards juvenile crime); see Editors'
Introduction to CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1, at 2; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998);
CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1 (discussing societal and political reactions to perceived increases in juvenile violent
crime); see generally BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS (1999) ("Increasingly punitive juvenile justice policies impose harsh
sanctions disproportionately on minority youth and foster the growing procedural and substantive convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts.").
6
PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER
PROVISIONS 1-7 (1998); YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS 44-60 (Donna M. Hamparian et al. eds.,

1982); Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1, at 45, 51-58;
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472-473 (1987).
7 Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusions of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History and Critique, in
CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1, at 83-144.
8 Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 (Cal. 2000), availableat http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/
VoterGuide/Propositions/2l text.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
9 Sara Raymond, From Playpens to Prisons: What the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998
Does to California'sJuvenile Justice System and Reasons to Repeal It, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 233, 258-289
(2000). The criteria for transfer include: any offense that would be punishable by death or life imprisonment if
committed by an adult; the use of a firearm in committing a felony; or an accusation that the youth committed any
crime in conjunction with a street gang, for the purpose of interfering with a victim's constitutional rights, or against a
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a rising tide of juvenile violence and the inadequacy of an outdated juvenile court to deal with
this violence.'0 Yet its critics contend that proponents used misleading and error-prone statistics
to support this claim because juvenile and gang violence actually had been declining in the years
preceding the initiative's enactment."1 Others have criticized the statute as a breach of due
process.12
An example of these statutory shifts at the national level is H.R. 1501, the Violent Juvenile
and Repeat Offender Accountability Act of 1999, sponsored by former Representative Bill
McCollum of Florida. 13 Had it been enacted, this act would have granted federal prosecutors
discretion to bypass juvenile court and directly file in criminal court all cases of defendants aged
fourteen and older, and cases of defendants aged thirteen if approved by the Assistant Deputy
Attorney General. To have been eligible, defendants must have been arrested for a violent felony
offense or for certain drug offenses. The Act was passed in the House of Representatives by a
margin of 249 to 181 in June 1999, but subsequently died in committee due to an attached
provision strengthening firearm laws. This Act is fascinating both for its demonstration of
legislators' willingness to forsake a doctrine of diminished capacity for criminally offending
youth, and for the ambivalence of legislators who want to crack down on adolescent violence yet
not adopt laws restricting youths' access to firearms.
The primary focus of Proposition 21, H.R. 1501, and similar laws is the removal of
adolescent offenders from the juvenile justice system to the criminal courts, in order to increase
the certainty and severity of punishment. 1 4 Following the transfer from juvenile to criminal court,
other companion statutes promote harsh punishment for youth convicted in the criminal court:
mandatory minimum terms of secure confinement, mandated confinement in secure settings, and
recently, confinement in adult institutions. 15 Several states have also adopted blended sentencing
6
schemes that allow transferring adolescents to adult institutions when they reach age eighteen.1
victim sixty-five-years-old or older. Id.
10 See Proposition 21, in California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election 119 (Mar. 7, 2000); Pete Wilson, How Is

Juvenile Justice Served?, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2000, at Z1. Proponents of increased use of transfer provisions claim
that juvenile courts were created to deal with petty offenses such as shoplifting and truancy, and are unable to punish
violent youth adequately. Proposition 21, supra;Pete Wilson, supra.
1" Brian Hansen, Kids in Prison:Are the States Too Tough on Young Offenders? 11 CQ RESEARCHER 347, 347 (Apr.
27, 2001); Barbara Stack White, Is This Justice? The 'Adult Time' Law for Juveniles Hasn't Fulfilled Its Backers'
Promises, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 18, 2001, at B1.

Raymond, supra note 9 at 263; see also George Mgdesyan, Gang Violence and Crime Prevention Act of 1998, 3 J.
LEG. ADVOC. & PRAC. 128 (2001). Critics claim that transferring all power to choose jurisdiction to the prosecutor
curtails a juvenile's due process safeguards. According to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
prosecutorial waiver is a shortcut that streamlines the juvenile justice process "at the expense of the individual's right to
due procedural safeguards." Raymond, supra note 9, at 274; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Franklin Zimring et al.,
Manduley v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (2001) (Nos. D036356, D036456), rev'd, 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002).
For arguments against breaches of due process in the juvenile court, see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood
and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Casefor Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120-1121
(1991); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 90 (1997).
13 H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. § 201 (1999).
14 See generally Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: The Decision to TransferJuveniles to Adult Court, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 (1995) ("Only those children who are actually nonamenable to treatment in the juvenile
justice system and dangerous should be transferred."); Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis
of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1998) ("Such transfer laws
are actually two-edged swords that (1) don't always give harsher and longer sentences to the worst offenders and (2)
forever doom other children who could be helped by the juvenile system."; Jonathan Simon, Power Without Parents:
Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363 (1995) (arguing "that the legal theory of the
juvenile court provides significant clues to the current [movement for change].").
15 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Conward, Where Have All the Children Gone: A Look at IncarceratedYouth in America, 27
WM.MITCHELL L. REV. 2435 n.2, 2442, 2454 (2001).
16 Richard Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts, in CHANGING BORDERS,
supra note 1, at 145, 145-46.
12
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Choosing the criteria for legal "adulthood" reflects tensions between retribution and
rehabilitation as well as questions about culpability and the risk of continued criminality versus
behavioral change. 7 Yet theory and law may be less important in the current debate on the
boundary of juvenile justice than are popular and political concerns with the perceived leniency
of punishment in the juvenile court.18 The common law assumed that adolescents are less
culpable than adults, and the juvenile court institutionalized this notion both jurisprudentially and
statutorily. 19 That is, the juvenile court offered a punishment discount for adolescents punished
as juveniles, relative to the punishment given to adults. This discount is rooted in the belief that
serious crimes committed by young offenders may reflect developmental deficiencies in
autonomy and social20 judgment, suggesting a reduction in their culpability and, in turn, their
punishment liability.
But for adolescents charged with serious crimes, the principle of penal proportionality would
require more severe punishment than that available in the juvenile court. 2' For such crimes, the
normative demand for punishment requires punitive responses often beyond the limitations of the
juvenile court.22 Recent developments in transfer law often express the preference of penal
proportionality over the common law assumptions of reduced culpability of adolescent
offenders.2 3 In this view, the traditional preoccupation with rehabilitation in the juvenile court,
with its limitations on punishment opportunities, deprecates the moral seriousness of crimes and
offers inadequate retribution. 24 Proponents of harsher punishments for adolescents argue that
punishments that are disproportionately lenient compared to the severity of the adjudicated
25
offense also undermine both the specific and general deterrent effects of legal sanctions.
See Editors' Introduction to CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1 (showing that the process of choosing criteria for
legal adulthood reflects tensions in sentencing policies and questions of criminal liability).
18 Putting Consequences Back into Juvenile Justice: Federal State andLocal Levels: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 10 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Bill
McCollum), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63893.000/hju63893_Of.htm ("Rates of
secure confinement for violent juveniles ... have actually decreased over the last 5 years. Many juveniles receive no
punishment at all. Nearly 40 percent of violent juvenile offenders who come into contact with the justice system have
their cases dismissed. By the time the courts finally lock up an older teenager on a crime of violence, the offender
often has a long rap sheet with arrests starting in the early teens."); 143 CONG. REc. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (commenting that procedural safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders, such as the
confidentiality ofjuvenile records, "coddl[e] hardened criminals"), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/rl05/rI05.html.
19 See generally FELD, supra note 5 (showing that the common law assumed that adolescents were less culpable than
adults and juvenile courts institutionalized this notion).
20 See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., EvaluatingAdolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV.
221 (1995) (challenging the use by policy researchers of a model for comparing adolescent and adult decision-making
based on informed consent standards); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: PsychosocialFactorsin Adolescent DecisionMaking, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 249-250 (1996).
21 Franklin E. Zimring, The Law's Construction of Children's Culpability, in COMPETENCE, CULPABILITY, AND
YOUTH: TOWARD A COHERENT SYSTEM OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 271 (Robert Schwartz & Thomas Grisso eds., 2000).
22 Franklin E. Zimring, The Punitive Necessity of Waiver, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1, at
207 (finding that
states have adopted rehabilitative juvenile justice systems while also adopting exceptions to the juvenile system's
!urisdiction when the state's punitive interests outweigh the interests in juvenile rehabilitation).
Hearing, supra note 18, at 10 (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum); 143 CONG. REc. S145 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (commenting that procedural safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders, such as the
confidentiality ofjuvenile records, "coddl[e] hardened criminals"), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/rl05/rl05.html.
24 See, e.g., FELD, supra note 5.
25 Standards are also unstated with respect to specific versus general deterrence of crime. Certainly, the rhetoric and
17

symbolism of these "reforms" has been directed at deterring adolescents as a class from crime commission by raising
the perceived certainty and severity of punishment. See M.A. Bortner, TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities:
Remand of Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986) (arguing that the political culture reinforces the
perceived benefits of remanding juveniles to adult court); Simon Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing
Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 521, 522 (1988)
(finding that the remand of juveniles to adult court has not resulted in any actual decrease in juvenile crime). Yet
criminal court punishments for adolescents, like their older cohorts, are accorded to individuals, usually within a
discretionary sentencing scheme with broad boundaries that govern the upper and lower limits of confinement. For
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These developments reflect the presumption in modem juvenile justice law that those who
commit crimes and are remanded to the criminal court, or even those who are charged with such
crimes, are fully culpable for their. acts.26 This legal threshold clashes with emerging empirical
evidence on the immaturity of adolescents with respect to both their ability to make informed and
nuanced judgments about their behavior, as well as their moral development. 27 By ignoring these
indicia of reduced culpability, the new transfer or waiver policies offend the common law
doctrine of incapacity.
Accordingly, demands for harsher punishment of adolescents are based on perceptions of a
leniency gap-that is, that juveniles committing serious crimes are punished less severely in the
juvenile court due to constrained punishment options.28 These constraints include fewer custodial
placements, shorter custodial sentences, and more permissive conditions of release on parole. It
is not clear, however, whether such a leniency gap exists. Both equivocal empirical evidence and
contrasting theories of felony case processing lead to contradictory predictions about the severity
of punishment awaiting adolescents transferred from juvenile to criminal court. Early research on
juveniles prosecuted in criminal courts suggested that juveniles may appear less serious in the
stream of cases 29 in criminal court in contrast to older, more experienced offenders. Juveniles
usually have less time to accumulate a record in the criminal justice process; as a result, the most
30
restrictive sentences are reserved for older defendants who are viewed as more "dangerous.
Furthermore, an adolescent defendant's age could lead judges to impose less severe sanctions, due
in part to the potential dangers to the youth of incarceration in an adult prison.
But the offense-based criminal court also may be inclined to view seriousjuvenile crime as
a threat to public safety and deserving of the most severe sanctions. Some research with chronic
violent adolescents adjudicated as adults suggests that they indeed are treated with equal or
greater severity as those who remain in juvenile court, 3 1 based simply on the severity of their
offenses. In juvenile court, the tension between punishment and treatment may mitigate sentence
severity. 32 Though violent offenders in juvenile court are the most serious cases before the court,
the traditional emphasis on rehabilitation, together with administrative and statutory limitations
on sanction length or severity, suggests that they may be treated less harshly than similar youth in
criminal court.

example, waiver statutes rarely achieve more than a symbolic role in reform, limited from larger impacts by their low
base rate and uncertain outcomes in the criminal court. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING
JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 81 (1991) (finding that criminal

laws remanding juveniles to adult court are becoming widespread despite a lack of empirical guidance showing that the
practice is effective in detering juvenile crime); Jeffrey Fagan & E. Piper Deschenes, Determinantsof JudicialWaiver
Decisionsfor Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314 (1990).
26 Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 307 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds.,

2000); Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Constructionof Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 590 (2000).
27 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching Adolescents' Judgment and Culpability, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 325, 333 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds.,

2000); Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 20, at 253-56 (1996).
28

PETER GREENWOOD ET AL., FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 9-10 (1984);

James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the CriminalJustice System: State of the Art, 18 LAW & POL'Y 17, 25 (1996).
29 See ROBERT EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969) (showing how cases are evaluated relative to other similar
cases).

30 GREENWOOD ET AL., supra note 28, at 9-10; Martin Roysher & Peter Edelman, TreatingJuveniles as Adults in New
York: What Does It Mean and How ls It Working?, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:
READINGS INPUBLIC POLICY 265 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981).

31 E.g., Cary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment,32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986).
See Part II of this Article, for a more detailed description of studies reaching this conclusion.
32 Jeffrey Fagan, Punishment or Treatment for Adolescent Offenders: Therapeutic Integrity and the Paradoxical

Effects of Punishment, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 385, 389-391 (1999).
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What happens to adolescents placed in the criminal justice system is the focus of this
Article. The pace of change, the severity of the new laws, the potential for unintended negative
outcomes, and the empirical reality of adult punishment of juvenile offenders gives this question
new urgency. Part II of this Article reviews prior empirical comparisons of punishment in
juvenile versus criminal court, which together offer inconclusive evidence regarding whether a
leniency gap does in fact exist between juvenile and criminal courts. Most studies that have
addressed the question of a leniency gap have several weaknesses and limited reliability. Most
focus on only judicial waiver, yet this mechanism is responsible for less than 10% of the
adolescents who wind up in criminal court.33 Other mechanisms that account for far more
adolescents in criminal court, such as legislative exclusion or a lowered overall boundary of
criminal court culpability, have received little attention by researchers comparing dispositions
across court types.34 Moreover, if discretionary transfer provisions such as judicial waiver
operate as intended by weeding out the most serious juvenile offenders for prosecution as adults,
then this selection bias would distort comparisons of outcomes in juvenile and criminal courts. In
addition, the inconsistencies and ambiguities of results from these previous research efforts
necessitate further evaluation.
Parts III and IV of this Article address this issue by reporting results of a natural experiment
that compares the certainty, celerity, and severity of sanctions for adolescents charged with
violent crimes and adjudicated in the juvenile court or criminal court. We compare punitiveness
in legal decision-making for adolescents aged fifteen and sixteen who are charged with serious
felonies and whose cases are adjudicated in the criminal court in New York City with a matched
sample of cases adjudicated in the juvenile court in three counties in northeastern New Jersey.
We compare case outcomes in juvenile and criminal court at three stages of case processing:
pretrial detention, disposition (including conviction and sentencing), and length of custodial
sentences imposed.
Jurisdictional differences in a single metropolitan area create conditions that allow for a
natural experiment.35 In New Jersey, nearly all offenders aged fifteen and sixteen remain in the
juvenile court, while these cases are adjudicated in the criminal courts in New York City.36 In
New York, fifteen-year-old defendants are prosecuted in criminal court under the New York
Juvenile Offender Law if they commit specific crimes, and the statutory age of majority is
sixteen. 37 Thus we compare cases of similar offenders in adjacent states who are prosecuted as
juveniles in one state (New Jersey) and as adults in the other (New York). The results
Howell, supra note 28, at 50.
But see Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism
Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77 (1996) [hereinafter Fagan, Comparative Advantage];
SINGER, supra note 3.
33
34

35

See, e.g., PHILLIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO (1995); MERCER SULLIVAN,

GETTING PAID: YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989) (showing the diffusion of crime networks and

markets across state borders in the New York City metropolitan area, including counties in both New York City and
northeastern New Jersey where transportation networks facilitate travel across state borders for criminal activity).
36 We use the term "criminal court" throughout this paper to refer to adult court, as opposed to juvenile court. Within
New York's criminal court system, there is a distinction between the misdemeanor criminal court and the felony
supreme court. We use the term criminal court to mean this entire court system, and not specifically the lower court.
37 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (Consol. 2002), provides:
1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than sixteen years old is not criminally
responsible for conduct.
2. A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age ig'criminal responsible for acts constituting murder in the second
degree ... ; and a person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes ...
[of] kidnapping in the first degree; ... arson in the first degree; ... assault in the first degree; ... manslaughter in the
first degree; ... rape in the first degree; ... sodomy in the first degree; ... aggravated sexual abuse; ... burglary in
the first degree; ... burglary in the second degree; ... arson in the second degree; ... robbery in the first degree; ...

robbery in the second degree... ; or ... an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first
degree.
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demonstrate that adolescents prosecuted as adults are at a greater risk of detention and
incarceration, and if incarcerated, sentenced to longer sentences than adolescents in juvenile
courts.
Part IV of the Article concludes by reviewing the implications of harsher punishment in the
criminal court for adolescent offenders on law, jurisprudence, and social policy. We find that
although criminal court prosecution results in more severe punishments for adolescents than they
would most likely receive in juvenile court, it also creates the opportunity for court actors to
mitigate this potential leniency gap and re-introduce aspects of child-saving.
I.

IS THERE A LENIENCY GAP?

Few studies have examined the effects of statutes and administrative laws that relocate
juvenile offenders to the criminal court, and specifically whether jurisdictional transfer from
juvenile to criminal court produces the intended outcomes of harsher and more certain
punishment. These few published studies have reported equivocal results with regard to whether
adolescents in criminal court receive more certain or severe punishment than adolescents in
juvenile court. Some early research suggests that juveniles may appear less serious in the stream
of cases in criminal court contrasted with older, more experienced offenders.38 A greater number
of studies, however, have found that youth transferred to criminal court are convicted and
incarcerated more often than youth in juvenile court. Yet this general result primarily may reflect
a selection process whereby only fairly serious cases are chosen for waiver to criminal court by
prosecutors, judges, or both. Such findings beg the question whether those very cases would also
have received similarly severe dispositions had they been retained in the juvenile court. 9 To
determine whether the criminal court is itself more punitive than the juvenile court requires
comparisons of court responses to equivalent cases. 40
A.

NATIONAL STATISTICS

We begin by examining recent national statistics to consider the general trend of greater
punishments for youth in the criminal court, and try to determine whether this is due largely to
differences between the cases processed in juvenile and criminal courts. Kevin Strom et al.
present case processing statistics for juveniles (younger than eighteen) in both juvenile and
criminal courts from the seventy-five largest counties in the country, during 1990, 1992, and
1994. 4 1 Table 1 shows a sample of their findings. The first result concerns the aggregate
distribution of charges at conviction in the two courts. Overall, cases of youth in juvenile court
involve considerably less violence than those of youth in criminal court. Of defendants at least
38

See GREENWOOD, supra note 28, at 12-17; see also Kristine Kinder et al., A Comparison of the Dispositions of

Juvenile Offenders Certifiedas Adults with Juvenile Offenders Not Certified, 43 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 37 (1995); Inger
Sagatun et al., The Effect of Transfersfrom Juvenile to Criminal Court: A LoglinearAnalysis, 8 CRIME & JUST. (1985).

39 To the extent that sentence lengths in criminal court exceed those available in juvenile court, particularly for youth
with only a short time remaining until the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, the criminal court will be more punitive.
See Donna Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81 (2000) [hereinafter
Bishop, Juvenile Offenders]; Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in CHANGING BORDERS,
supra note 1, at 227, 233-37. States, however, are increasingly experimenting with blended sentencing and other ways
of extending the juvenile court jurisdiction at sentencing, which may partly eliminate this effect. See Redding &
Howell, supra note 16, at 145.
40

See, e.g., FELD, supra note 5; PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., AGE, CRIME, AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM

JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT 12-39 (1980); Joel Peter Eigen, Punishing Youth Homicide Offenders in Philadelphia,72 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1072 (1981); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision:
Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELNQ. 259 (1987); Peter Greenwood, Differences in

CriminalBehavior and Court Responses Among Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, in 7 CRIME AND JUST. 151, 160164 (1986) (discussing reasons for statistical inconsistencies among articles analyzing juvenile justice).
41

KEVIN STROM ET AL., JUVENILE FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS 1-11 (1998) (using data collected by the

Bureau of Justice Statistics from the seventy-five most populous U.S. counties in its biennial State Court Processing
Statistics program to show how states move juveniles to adult courts).
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fifteen years old convicted in juvenile court, only 22% were convicted of violent offenses and
46% of property offenses. In contrast, in the criminal court, 51% were convicted of violent
offenses and 21% of property offenses.42
This disparity among types of cases in each court affects detention, conviction, and
sentencing rates. Overall, the juvenile court detained only 35% of the defendants at any time
prior to disposition, while the criminal court detained 49% of the defendants from arrest until
disposition. Yet stratifying cases rather grossly on the most serious charge and separately
examining violent, property, and drug offenses reveals that this disparity is due mostly to
different treatment of violent offenders (43% versus 56%, respectively, are detained), although
detention rates are similar for property and drug cases. Further, criminal courts convict at a
slightly higher rate than the juvenile court (59% versus 55%, respectively).43 This difference
generally holds for each type of charge, and is actually somewhat larger for drug offenses.
At sentencing, one can compare juvenile court residential placements either to adult prison
sentences only, or to both adult jail and prison sentences. Because the distinction between jail
and prison largely turns on sentence length (less than versus more than. a year), both are
comparable to some juvenile court residential placements. The data from Strom et al. permit us
to compare the adult incarceration rate both with and without jail sentences. Including jail
sentences in the criminal court's incarceration rate makes the overall rate considerably higher
than the juvenile court rate (68% versus 40%, respectively). While this difference is largest for
violent offenses, the criminal court incarcerates more often for each charge type. If criminal
court incarceration is restricted instead to prison sentences, then the overall criminal court
imprisonment rate still remains higher than the juvenile court's incarceration rate (49% versus
40%, respectively), but the difference is limited to violent offenses (68% versus 44%,
respectively), and even reverses for drug offenses.
Table 1 presents data aggregated across the various legal mechanisms by which juveniles
appear in criminal court (i.e., judicial waiver, prosecutorial election, legislative exclusion). Most
of those mechanisms require decision-makers to select more violent and serious offenders;
chronic offenders; or violent, serious, and chronic offenders for transfer to the criminal court. In
contrast, when state law sets the overall age of criminal majority below eighteen, no discretionary
transfer decisions are made. In these states, some adolescents younger than eighteen are
considered adults by definition, not by any discretionary selection process.44 Youth who are
adults by definition might have cases more similar to those of youth in juvenile court, and more
distinct from cases of youth who are adults by discretionary decisions.
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At arrest, charge distributions show the same basic pattern, although even more criminal court arrests were on

violent offenses (66%) and fewer on property offenses (17%). Id. at 2 tbls.2-3.
43 For ease of exposition, we use the term conviction in describing both juvenile and criminal court outcomes,
although, technically, the juvenile court adjudicates rather than convicts.
44 Youth can be adults by definition if a state defines a lower overall threshold for the criminal age of majority. Most
states maintain the age of eighteen as their age of criminal majority, eight states use age seventeen, and three use age
sixteen. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 4, at 93. Even when statutes set an age threshold for specific offenses,
however, police and prosecutors can influence whether the offender falls above or below the offense threshold for
transfer by exercising discretion in charging. For example, a second-degree robbery for an offender age fourteen falls
under the New York Juvenile Offender Law that allows transfer to criminal court, while a third-degree robbery for the
same person is a juvenile offense that disallows transfer to criminal court. The characteristics of second- versus thirddegree robbery involve subjective criteria such as the degree of force used, giving wide berth to police and prosecutors
to steer cases toward the juvenile court or criminal court.
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TABLE 1: CHARGES AND DISPOSITIONS FOR YOUTH IN JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL COURT

1990, 1992, AND 199445

Charge Distribution at Conviction
Juvenile Court
Criminal Court
Detained
Juvenile Court
Criminal Court
Convicted
Juvenile Court
Criminal Court
Incarcerated in Jail or Prison
Juvenile Court
Criminal Court: Prison Sentences
Criminal Court: Jail or Prison Sentences

All Cases
(%)

Violent
Offenses
(%)

Property
Offenses
(%))

Drug
Offenses

100
100

22
51

46
21

1.3
15

35
49

43
56

29
26

40
37

55
59

51
56

55
61

55
68

40
49
68

44
68
79

35
32
57

41
34
50

Table 2 shows trends identified by Jodi Brown and Patrick Langan comparing dispositions
in states where adolescents reach the age of majority below eighteen by statute (and are excluded
from juvenile court), with states where adolescents are transferred to adult courts by discretionary
decisions of judges or prosecutors.46 Brown and Langan estimate that of youth who were adults
by definition and convicted of felonies in 1994, only 28% were convicted of violent offenses and
31% of property offenses. In contrast, most of the juveniles (53%) transferred to criminal court
were convicted of violent offenses and 24% were convicted of property offenses. By comparison,
only 19% of convicted adults (over eighteen) were convicted of a violent offense and 32% of a
property offense. Thus, the cases of youth transferred to the criminal court seem significantly
more severe. This phenomenon occurs because these cases involve a higher proportion of violent
offenses than (1) the cases of youth who are adults by definition, (2) the overall adult felony
caseload, or (3) the overall juvenile court caseload (22%, shown earlier in Table 1).
Not surprisingly, when convicted, the transferred youth receive custodial sentences more
often than youth who are adults by definition. Considering prison sentences only (and excluding
jail sentences), we find that youth transferred to adult court are imprisoned more often than youth
who are adults by definition (63% versus 54%, respectively), or than adults in general (46%).
However, this difference largely results from the differing charge distributions. Looking
separately at violent, property, or drug offenses, these sentencing disparities greatly diminish
(e.g., 78% versus 73% received prison sentences for violent offenses). The same basic pattern is

45

STROM ET AL., supra note 41, tbls.6-11, 13. Note: Juvenile court cases are limited to offenders fifteen years of age
or older. Charge distributions are shown at conviction for ease of comparison to Table Two, and, because only three
charge categories are shown, percentages do not sum to 100%. Detention and conviction rates are stratified by arrest
charge in criminal court and referral charge in juvenile court. Detention rates in juvenile court include any detention
for any length of time before disposition, but in criminal court are limited to detention for the entire period from arrest
through disposition, which somewhat inflates the relative juvenile court rate. Incarceration is only of those convicted.
46

JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1994 (1998) (basing

estimates on data from another Bureau of Justice Statistics biennial statistics program, the National Judicial Reporting
Program, which samples all felony sentences in state courts).
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also found when jail sentences are included.4 7
These national aggregates suggest that the criminal court is more punitive to juveniles in
general than is the juvenile court. At the same time, much of that punitiveness is due to the
selection of more serious cases for transfer to the criminal court, and the resulting different charge
distributions. Within charge categories, the differences are much smaller. Although these
selection effects can be partially controlled by looking within charges, it is hard to match cases
well using national figures. Such aggregates include cases across many different localities, which
vary in criminal and juvenile justice policies and practices. These localities may have
nonequivalent offense definitions or charge distributions, and may report to the national statistics
program at different rates, among other difficulties. To determine whether the criminal court is
more punitive than the juvenile court for equivalent cases, therefore, requires more local studies,
which can focus more carefully on and calibrate these comparisons.
TABLE

2: INCARCERATION IN CRIMINAL COURT, 199448
All Cases

Violent
Offenses

Property
Offenses

Drug
Offenses

100
100
100

19
28
53

32
31
24

31
24
13

46
54
63

62
:73
78

42
47
42

43
47
45

72
66
80

83
77
88

70
62
65

71
56
70

(%/)

Charge Distribution at Conviction
All Adult Felony Convictions
Under Eighteen and Adults by Statute
Youth Transferred to Criminal Court
Prison Sentences Only
Adults over Eighteen
Under Eighteen and Adults by Statute
Youth Transferred to Criminal Court
Jail or Prison Sentences
Adults over Eighteen
Under Eighteen and Adults by Statute
Youth Transferred to Criminal Court
B.

(%/)

(%/)

(/).

LOCAL STUDIES OF YOUTH IN CRIMINAL COURT

In local or single jurisdiction studies, it is especially clear that local decision-makers select
some cases for transfer while retaining others, with the intent of transferring a different set of
cases to criminal court than the cases retained in the juvenile court.49 We limit our review of
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DAVID J. LEVIN ET AL., STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1996, 46-49 (2000), report similar results

for the next biennial survey, for 1996 cases. The overall difference between youth transferred and youth punished as
adults by definition is somewhat larger (60% versus 37% prison sentences, respectively). Again, this difference seems
largely attributable to the different charge distributions, so that sentences were similar for violent or drug offenses;
however, in 1996, youth who were adults by definition received considerably fewer custodial placements than in earlier
years (down from 47% to 18% receiving prison sentences). As a result, transferred property offenders seem to receive
relatively more punitive sentences (46% prison). Id.
I , 1
48 BROWN & LANGAN, supranote 46, tbls. 1.1, 6.2, 6.4, 6.5. Note: These cases consider only those juveniles convicted
in criminal court. Percentages in specific charge categories do not sum to 100% because they are subsets of all
offenses.
49 How serious a methodological problem these selection effects pose depends on the local realities of transfer. See
Donna Bishop et al., ProsecutorialWaiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 179 (1989);
Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial
Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1991).
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local studies to those using conservative strategies to control for selection bias.

Researchers studying this process usually control for selection bias in judicial or
prosecutorial transfer by limiting the comparison group of juvenile court cases to the most serious
cases, making them more comparable to the generally more serious (transferred) criminal court
cases. One strategy is to limit comparisons only to cases that were considered for transfer to
criminal court. Criminal court treatment of cases that were in fact transferred is then compared to
the juvenile court treatment of those cases that were considered for transfer but ultimately
retained in juvenile court. This considerably narrows the range of cases to be compared,
controlling for much of the selection bias.
Such studies generally find criminal courts to be more punitive, although not without
exception. For example, Cary Rudman et al. examined cases considered for transfer between
1980 and 1984 in three jurisdictions: Boston, Newark, and Phoenix. 51 They report that over 90%
of cases in their sample considered for transfer were convicted, regardless of whether cases were
in fact transferred to criminal court; however, the criminal court imposed longer sentences than
did the juvenile court. Barnes and Franz examined all the cases considered for transfer in a large
metropolitan county in northern California between March 1978 and December 1983.52 They
found that person offenses received harsher sentences in criminal court than in juvenile court, but
that property offenses were treated more leniently in criminal court. Marcy Rasmussen
Podkopacz and Barry Feld examined cases considered for transfer in Hennepin County,
Minnesota, from 1986 through 1992 and also controlled for many case characteristics using
multivariate statistical procedures. 53 They found that transferred cases were more likely to be
convicted than cases retained by the juvenile court and generally received longer sentences as
well.
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce et al. used another strategy to control for selection bias.54 For each of
475 cases transferred to the Florida criminal court in 1995 or 1996, a matching case was
identified in the juvenile court with equivalent current offense, number of charges, criminal
history, and demographics. Outcomes were then compared for the pairs of cases. Fewer cases
were disposed and sentenced in juvenile court than in criminal court (325 versus 395, or 68%
versus 83%, respectively). Of those sentenced, the juvenile court made fewer residential
placements (153, or 47%) than the criminal court (247, or 63%, jail and/or prison).
Jeffrey Fagan examined the effects of the New York model relatively soon after enactment
of the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, which excludes certain adolescents from juvenile court. 55 In
studying the outcomes of 1981-82 cases, he took advantage of a natural experiment afforded by
the state line (the Hudson River) running through the larger New York City metropolitan area.
New Jersey retains a traditional system in which eighteen is the age of criminal responsibility and
in which the primary waiver mechanism to criminal court is judicial waiver. Thus, Fagan was
able to compare conviction and sentencing rates (as well as recidivism, not summarized here) of
50

For more comprehensive reviews, see Bishop, Juvenile Offender, supra note 39; Bishop & Frazier, supra note 39;

Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1998);
Howell, supra note 28.
"' Cary Rudman et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Processand Punishment,32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75, 86 (1986).
52 Carole W. Barnes & Randal S. Franz, Questionably Adult: Determinants and Effects of the Juvenile Waiver
Decision, 6 JUST. Q. 117,133 (1989).
53 Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An EmpiricalStudy of Judicial Waiver, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 449 (1996).
54 LoNN LANZA-KADUCE ET AL., JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT STUDY: FINAL REPORT 18, tbls.2-4 (2002),
availableat http://www.djj.state.fl.us/statsnresearch/contractreports/juveniletransfers.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
55 Fagan, Comparative Advantage, supra note 34; Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The
Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony
Offenders, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK 238 (James C. Howell et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Fagan, Separatingthe Men from the Boys].
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comparable cases across the state line. Such comparisons across this jurisdictional boundary are
largely immune to the selection bias that arises when decision-makers select serious cases for the
criminal court, because cases cannot migrate from the criminal court (in New York) to the
juvenile court (in New Jersey).5 6
Fagan examined first-degree burglary and robbery cases of fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds.
Two hundred criminal court cases were sampled from each of two New York counties (Kings
[Brooklyn] and Queens), and two hundred juvenile court cases from each of two New Jersey
counties (Essex and Passaic). For robbery cases, the juvenile court convicted adolescents less
often than the criminal court (46% versus 57%, respectively), and the juvenile court then imposed
incarceration less often than the criminal court (18% versus 46%, respectively). For burglary
cases, conviction rates in the two courts were similar, but the juvenile court imposed incarceration
less often (24% versus 47%, respectively).5 7
In sum, the prior research comparing punishments in juvenile and criminal courts is
equivocal. Though some studies find that a leniency gap exists whereby youth in juvenile court
are treated more leniently than those in criminal court, others do not reach this conclusion. Many
of these studies are limited by the difficulty of finding suitable cases for comparison across the
two types of courts.
II. A NATURAL EXPERIMENT ON THE PUNISHMENT OF ADOLESCENTS
A.

STUDY DESIGN

This study is a replication and extension of Fagan's earlier cross-jurisdictional comparison
of adolescent felony case processing in New York versus New Jersey, 58 using cases
approximately ten years later, in 1992-93. 59 We compare punishments received by adolescents
(ages fifteen to sixteen) charged in criminal court in three New York City counties to a matched
sample of cases adjudicated in the juvenile court in three adjacent counties in northeastern New
Jersey. This replication extends the previous study in three ways: it adds another county to each
state sample, doubles the sample size from each county, and broadens the eligible offenses to
include youth charged with first or second-degree aggravated assault.
Cases were sampled from the population of filed cases. In principle, judicial waiver may reduce the severity of the
New Jersey cases retained in the juvenile court, and reverse waiver is possible for the fifteen-year-olds in the New York
sample; however, very few cases-only 3.3% of the robbery cases and none of the burglary cases in his sample-were
waived. Fagan, ComparativeAdvantage, supra note 34, at 105 n. 11.
57 There have been several other empirical studies of the effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, though few
have examined the certainty, severity, or celerity of punishment before and after its passage in 1978. George E.
Hairston, Black Crime and the New York State Juvenile Offender Law: A Considerationof the Effects of Lowering the
Age of Criminal Responsibility, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: READINGS IN
PUBLIC POLICY 295 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Roysher & Edelman, supra note 30; Simon Singer & David
McDowall, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
1988).
8 Fagan, Comparative Advantage, supra note 34.
59 Within-jurisdictional comparisons of New York City's juvenile versus criminal court during the same time period
are reported in AKIVA LIBERMAN & LAURA WINTERFIELD, CASE PROCESSING OF JUVENILE ARRESTS IN NEW YORK
CITY'S ADULT AND JUVENILE COURTS DURING FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1996), and Akiva Liberman & William Raleigh,
Specialized Court Parts for Juvenile Offenders in New York City's Adult Felony Courts: Case Processing in 1994-1995
and 1995-1996 (May 1, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at 1998 Annual Conference of the American Society
of Criminology, on file with the Stanford Law and Policy Review) (finding that the criminal court was more punitive
than the juvenile court over its entire caseload). Liberman and Raleigh restricted juvenile court cases to those
comparable to the criminal court cases on age and charge (i.e., fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds arrested on JuvenileOffender-eligible charges), and also examined robbery cases alone, which comprise more than half of the criminal
court caseload. A higher proportion of cases were formally prosecuted (filed) in the criminal court than in the juvenile
court system (88% versus 50% overall, or 88% versus 48% for robberies alone, respectively), and the criminal court
detained more cases pretrial than the juvenile court (48% versus 18% overall, or 41% versus 15% for robberies alone,
respectively); however, these within-jurisdictional results were more ambiguous at conviction and sentencing.
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1.

Statutory Contexts

New York's statute governing jurisdiction of adolescent offenders provides fertile ground
for comparing outcomes of cases in juvenile and criminal courts. Sixteen is the age for criminal
responsibility in New York. In 1978, New York became the first state to mandate legislatively
the automatic transfer of youth accused of serious offenses to criminal court.60 New York
lowered the age of criminal responsibility by excluding from Family (juvenile) Court jurisdiction
the designated felony list of seventeen felony crimes-various categories of robbery, burglary,
assault, rape, and kidnapping-committed by fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds, as well as murder
by youth thirteen or older. 61 Because the legislative definition excludes these ages and offenses
from Family Court jurisdiction, those cases originate in adult criminal court and include criminal
procedural safeguards such as indictment, bail, and public hearings. As a result, youth
automatically are processed in the criminal justice system prior to any determination of their
suitability for treatment in the Family Court. These adolescents who are prosecuted in the
criminal court ate referred to as "Juvenile Offenders." Youth convicted and sentenced as
Juvenile Offenders receive determinate sentences with mandatory terms in secure facilities and
for periods substantially longer than the five-year maximum term for juvenile "designated
felons. 62 Although prosecution of Juvenile Offenders originates in adult criminal court,
provisions exist for prosecutors and criminal court judges to remove or remand these Juvenile
Offender cases to Family Court prior to indictment, before trial, or for sentencing following
criminal conviction. 63 Despite these "reverse waiver" or transfer-back provisions, New York's
Juvenile Offender Law has been called "the toughest juvenile offender law in the country,'6 4 "this
nation's toughest law dealing with children accused of committing certain violent felony
offenses, ' ' 65 and "among the most severe in the country by initiating prosecution in the adult
courts and providing for longer sentences. 66
Until the early 1980s, the New Jersey Juvenile Code subscribed to the traditional,
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice. From its inception in 1929, children charged as
delinquents (i.e., accused of criminal or status offenses) who were below the age of sixteen
(amended to eighteen in 1952) were adjudicated under the jurisdiction of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts.6 7 In 1970, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed in New Jersey ex reL L.N.
1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478 § 2. Juvenile Offender Law offenses include: second-degree murder and attempted
murder, first- and second-degree arson, first-degree kidnapping and attempted kidnapping, first-degree manslaughter,
first-degree rape, first- and second-degree robbery, first- and second-degree burglary, first-degree sodomy, aggravated
sexual abuse, first-degree firearms use, and first- and second-degree assault. See SINGER, supra note 3, at 56-68; Simon
I. Singer et al., The Reproduction of Juvenile Justice in Criminal Court: A Case Study of New York's Juvenile Offender
Law, in CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 1, at 353; see generally Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE
BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE (1995) (describing one family's interaction with the
juvenile justice system since the Civil War).
61 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478 § 2. For specific offenses, see supra note 60. Initially, there were twelve offenses on this
list of designated felonies, but it has since grown to seventeen by legislative amendments. ERIC WARNER, THE
JUVENILE OFFENDER HANDBOOK (2000).
62 Judges may depart from the prescribed sentencing ranges if they reclassify the offender as a youthful offender,
which is a distinct dispositional category that is not considered an official conviction; but for this reclassification to
proceed, the offender must not have any previous convictions for any designated felony offenses. Youthful offender
status seals the record and allows a judge to depart from sentencing guidelines to give the defendant a non-custodial
sentence. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (Consol. 2002).
63 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10 (Consol. 2002).
64 Lucia Beadel Whisenand & Edward J. McLaughlin, Completing the Cycle: Reality and the Juvenile Justice System
in New York State, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
65 Alison Marie Grinnell, Searchingfor a Solution: The Future of New York's Juvenile Offender Law, 16 N.Y.
L. SCH.
60

J. HuM. RTs. 635, 636 (2000).
66
67

Roysher & Edelman, supra note 30, at 266.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-2, 2A:4-14 (West 1952).

The original 1929 statute also gave this juvenile court
jurisdiction over youth charged as disorderly persons, vagrants, incorrigibles, immoral, truant, "growing up in
idleness," or "who deported herself so as to endanger her morals, health or general welfare." See 1929 N.J. Laws 157.
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that "[t]he philosophy of our juvenile court system is aimed at rehabilitation through reformation
and education in order to restore a delinquent youth to a position of responsible citizenship." 68 In
1973, the state removed status offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.69
In 1982, the New Jersey legislature enacted a new Juvenile Code effective on September 1,
1983, that recognized the dual purposes of juvenile courts:
This bill recognizes that the public welfare and the best interests of juveniles can be served
most effectively though an approach which provides for harsher penalties for juveniles who
commit serious acts or who are repetitive offenders, while broadening family responsibility
and the use of alternative dispositions for juveniles committing less serious offenses ....
The new legislation included tougher delinquency sentencing and waiver provisions, and
71
permitted the use of short-term incarceration, not to exceed sixty days, to deter future offehding.
The new law also created a presumption for secure confinement in the juvenile system for youth
charged with serious crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery. 72 The New Jersey juvenile code
authorizes substantial sentences for the most serious crimes and proportionally shorter sentences
for less serious offenses.7 3
Because the new code substantially strengthened the delinquency sentencing options, the
legislature anticipated that reliance on discretionary transfer to criminal court might decrease.74
At the same time, the code substantially revised the transfer provisions in three ways. First, the
new code created a presumption for transferring youth to adult court if the prosecutor charged
them with certain serious offenses-e.g., homicide, robbery, and arson. Second, it put the burden
of proof on the defendant to demonstrate their amenability to treatment. Third, it lowered from
twenty-one to nineteen the age by which the juvenile system must satisfactorily treat the
defendant.75 Despite these conditions promoting judicial transfer, the incidence of transfer
remains low in New Jersey and continues to remain low to the present day.76

263 A.2d 150, 154-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970), aff'dper curiam, 270 A.2d 409 (N.J. 1970).
69 The state created a separate jurisdictional category called Juveniles in Need of Supervision (JINS), which are
68

children under eighteen years of age who committed non-criminal acts such as incorrigibility, truancy, and
disobedience. See 1973 N.J. Laws 306; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4-43(a), 2A:4-45 (West 1981). The legal separation of
status offenses and delinquency also included a prohibition on the secure detention and institutional confinement of
status offenders. See id.
70 Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, 641-L.1982, c.77, 1982 Leg., at 1 (N.J. 1982); see also A.B. 641-45 c. 81,
1982 Leg. (N.J. 1982).
71 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43(20)(c)(1).
72 id.
73 In addition, the legislation provides for periods of incarceration beyond the statutory maximum if a juvenile is
convicted of a crime of the first, second, or third degree; has two prior convictions of crimes of the first or seconddegree; and has been committed previously to a correctional facility. § 2A:4A-44(d)(3). In fact, the statutes include a
sentencing table that operates as a sentencing guideline system. § 2A:4A-44(d)(1). In addition, youth with prior
convictions who are convicted of murder may have their twenty-year term extended by five years. Youth with prior
records who are convicted of other crimes of the first, second, or third degree may have their maximum sentence
extended by an additional two years. The release of juveniles on parole prior to the completion of at least one-third of
their sentence requires the approval of the sentencing court. See § 2A:4A-44(d)(2).
74 "Practically, this presumption [for juvenile imprisonment for serious offenses], may encourage less dependency on
waiver of a juvenile to the adult court, because of some assurance that the juvenile committing a serious crime would
possibly receive a more appropriate, disposition in the juvenile system." Senate Judiciary Committee Statement, 641
L.1982, c. 77, 1982 Leg., at § 25 (N.J. 1982).
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-14 (West 1984).
76 JUVENILE DELINQUENCY DISPOSITION COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF THE NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 3738 (1986); Fagan, Comparative Advantage, supra note 34, at 77-109; Wayne S. Fisher & Lori Teichman, Juvenile
Waivers to Adult Court: A Report to the New Jersey Legislature, 9 CRIM. JUST. Q. 68, 70-72 (1986);. In the New Jersey
sample in this study, 1.2% of the cases were transferred to criminal court. These cases are included in the New Jersey
sample for all following analyses.
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The sharply differing jurisdictional boundary between juvenile and criminal courts in New
York and New Jersey, coupled with their geographical contiguity and shared social ecology,
creates the conditions to conduct a natural experiment. Instead of randomization of cases, the
geographical border establishes contrasting jurisdictional conditions for the adjudication of
adolescent felony offenders.
2.

Selecting Counties within States

In New York, three counties supplied cases for the study: Kings (Brooklyn), Bronx, and
Queens Counties. In New Jersey, cases were sampled from Essex, Hudson, and Passaic Counties.
These six counties are part of a large standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) and are
interrelated in economics, transportation, media and culture, and major social institutions such as
educational institutions and medical centers.
Matching criteria for counties included
demographic, socio-economic, labor force, and housing characteristics. According to 1990
census data, these counties are well matched regarding rates of unemployment, poverty, femaleheaded households, and residential mobility. 77 Moreover, the crime problems among juveniles
and young adults in these communities are comparable relative to other counties in their states
and to each other. 8 Each county was among the top five counties in the state in their
contributions to the state's prison population and to the state's homicide fatalities. 79 When the
cases were sampled, each state was experiencing over-crowding in its adult correctional facilities.
Each county has a local incarceration facility for adults (New York City counties share the Rikers
Island facility) and local juvenile and adult detention facilities (New York City's five boroughs
share beds in the city's juvenile detention system). Each has a well-developed indigent defender
system for juveniles and adults.
Crime markets and criminal activity in this metropolitan region also often span county and
state lines, which suggests a homogeneity of crime problems that also strengthens the study
design. Drug markets in this region, for example, include regional territory and exchanges with
sellers and buyers moving across counties and, at times, across state lines. 80 Adolescent and
young adult crime, then, are part of a redistributive process within a regional informal and illicit
economy.
3.

Selecting Charge Categories

We sampled cases in which adolescents aged fifteen and sixteen were charged with felony
robbery, assault, or burglary. These three types of crimes are recurrent criminological events that
are paradigm cases representing two faces of the debate in. defining juvenile jurisdiction.
Robbery and assault events comprise the prototypical violent juvenile crimes that have evoked
fear of crime as well as legislative action in the past decade. 8' Adolescent burglary offenses
encompass a broader, more complex, and at times persistent pattern of crimes that are recurring
challenges to judicial responses to juvenile crime. Although many consider property offenses less
serious than violent offenses, property offenders with long prior records pose a different type of
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CITY AND COUNTY DATA BOOK (1994) (projecting 1990 U.S. Census data), available at
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/ccdb (last visited Feb. 11, 2002). We used 1994 estimates as the closest time point to the
?oint of origin of the cases.
See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 35 (analyzing three neighborhoods' socioeconomic conditions to find universal
economic rationales for their behavior).
79 Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions on Adolescent Felony
Offenders: Report to the NationalInstitute of Justice (1991).
86 See generally BoURGoIs, supra note 35 (discussing the drug problem in East Harlem); ROBERT JACKALL, WILD
77

COWBOYS: URBAN MARAUDERS & THE FORCES OF ORDER (1997) (telling multiple stories about juvenile offenders based

on true events).
81 Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV.
965, 973-986 (1995); Alden D. Miller & Lloyd E. Ohlin, The Politics of Secure Care in Youth CorrectionalReform, in
VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: AN ANTHOLOGY 137 (Mathidas et al. eds., 1984).
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challenge (regarding the court's ability to prevent continued delinquency) to the perceived
legitimacy and efficacy of the juvenile court-a challenge that also has animated the policy
initiatives to narrow or to eliminate the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Property offenders
comprise a large proportion of incarcerated juveniles in each state and also those transferred to
criminal court,82 which illustrates their importance in the policy debate on the juvenile court.
The distinct age-specific jurisdictional boundaries for these offenses contribute to the study
design. In New York, under the Juvenile Offender Law, cases alleging first- and second-degree
felony robbery, first- and second-degree aggravated assault, and first-degree burglary charges for
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old defendants originate in criminal court. 83 Although the criminal
court holds original jurisdiction, the criminal court judge may transfer cases to the juvenile court.
The age of majority in New York is sixteen, so no such reverse waiver is possible for the sixteenyear-olds in our sample.8 4 In New Jersey, initial jurisdiction is in the juvenile court until eighteen
years of age, although transfer to criminal court is permitted at age thirteen. Accordingly, at the
time of the study, all charges against fifteen- and sixteen-year-old defendants are adjudicated in
the juvenile court, unless judicially waived to the criminal court; however, very few youth are
transferred. 85
4.

Selecting Cases

We used a multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure to select cases. First, a
population of eligible cases was identified for each county based on the case and charge criteria.
Second, cases were selected based on their representation by age, sex, and offense within each
county. This procedure generated a sample of n = 2382 adolescents aged fifteen to sixteen and
charged with the specified penal code violations between January 1, 1992, and December 31,
1993. Cases were selected after charges were filed in court: at Supreme Court indictment (the
felony court) in New York and upon filing of juvenile court petitions in New Jersey. This
selection procedure ensured that only cases that have passed a probable cause determination (i.e.,
a legal sufficiency determination) in each court are included in the sample. Juvenile Offender
cases in New York are originally heard in the Criminal Court (the court of general jurisdiction) in
New York City. They are arraigned there and, if indicted, they are arraigned again in the
Supreme Court, and adjudicated there. In New Jersey, petitions are screened initially by court
intake officers simultaneously with prosecutorial screening for legal sufficiency. This procedure
avoided sample attrition at the outset from prosecutorial screening or dismissals prior to
arraignment.
5.

Data Sources

New Jersey data for Hudson County were provided in automated format by the New Jersey
Administrative Office of Courts. For the other two New Jersey counties, data were manually
collected at the county courthouses from case files of sampled individuals. These data were
supplemented by adult records provided by the New Jersey State Police. New York data were
provided by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, the city's pretrial services agency,
which collects and stores data on all New York City criminal defendants. The New York data
were supplemented by data from the New York Department of Criminal Justice Services; this
includes data concerning cases waived from the criminal court down to New York family court,
YOUTH IN ADULT COURT: BETWEEN Two WORLDS, supra note 6, at 201-32; Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the
American Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME & JUST. 197 (1993).
83 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478 § 2. See supra note 60 for a list ofjuvenile offenses.
84 In order to prevent any selection bias with regard to the fifteen-year-old defendants in the current sample who may
be transferred to New York juvenile court, we have retained in our dataset all such cases. These cases comprise 146 of
the 407 fifteen-year-old defendants in New York who were formally transferred to juvenile court. They are included in
the New York sample in all following analyses.
85 See supra text accompanying note 76.
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STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

PUNISHMENT, PROPORTIONALITY, AND JURISDICTIONAL TRANSFER
and data (with identifying information removed) on defendants' prior family court cases
6.

Sample Description

Table 3 compares the demographic, legal, and offense characteristics of the sampled cases.
Though the cases from each state are similar along most dimensions, cases differ by state in a few
important ways. The New York (criminal court) sample consists of greater percentages of
sixteen-year-olds, minority defendants, and male defendants than in New Jersey (juvenile court).
In the New Jersey sample, a greater percentage of individuals have prior arrest records, are
arrested during sampled case processing, and have arrest warrants issued by a judge during case
processing. All variables are included as control variables in the following analyses to prevent
the introduction of a sample selection bias.
Another noticeable difference between samples is the distribution of arrest charges. The
New Jersey cases are nearly equally divided among the three sampled charges, though the New
York cases consist of mostly robbery arrests. This is the result of the sampling procedure--cases
were selected based on their representation within each state's court system. Thus, sample
differences result from natural variation between the two populations sampled. This sampling
method included the most serious fifteen- and sixteen-year-old offenders in each state other than
adolescents arrested for homicide or sexual assault. It should be noted that though they involve
different behaviors, most first-degree aggravated assault and first-degree robbery are of equal
severity within each jurisdiction.8 6 Again, we include arrest charges as control variables in all
analyses, as well as analyze the data separately by arrest charge.

In New York, all of the most serious robberies and aggravated assaults are considered B felony charges and are
thus of equal severity. In New Jersey, most robberies of greatest severity are considered second-degree offenses, as are
all aggravated assaults of the greatest severity.
86
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TABLE

3: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY STATE8 7

Age:
Fifteen
Sixteen
Sex:
Female
Male
Race:
White
African-American
Hispanic
Asian
Other and Unknown
Charge:
Robbery
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Ever Detained by Court
Warrant Ordered by Court
Associated Weapon Charge
Prior Arrest Record
Mean number of Prior Arrests
Mean number of Prior Convictions
Rearrested During Case Processing
Mean number of Rearrests During
Case Processing
B.

MEASURES AND VARIABLES

1.

Independent Variables

New Jersey
(n = 1061)

New York
(n = 1321)

46.9
53.1

30.8
69.2

17.1
82.9

11.8
88.2

13.3
54.8
26.1
0.2
5.6

4.9
58.0
32.2
1.4
3.5

25.4
43.4
31.1
41.4
18.6
34.9
67.0
5.6
3.1
37.1

80.3
15.2
4.5
47.0
7.9
, 41.4
45.0
2.4
1.1
16.3

1.9

1.3

We collected data that were uniformly available and similarly measured across states. The
resultant set of independent variables is more detailed and extensive than many prior studies
examining court outcomes.88 Table 4 shows the domains of information and specific variables
within each.

87

All figures report the percentage of each state sample with corresponding characteristics (e.g., the percentage aged

fifteen, and the percentage aged sixteen), except for the mean number of prior arrests, mean number of prior
convictions, and the mean number of rearrests during case processing, which are means as listed.
88 For reviews, see Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence
with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts: Who Is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. Soc.
REv. 705, 706-08 (2000).
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TABLE

Domain
Demographic Characteristics
of Defendant

Offense

Offender

Case Processing

Court Jurisdiction
2.

4:

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Measure
Age
Sex (dummy variable for female)
Ethnicity (dummy variables for African American, White,
Hispanic, and All Other Ethnicities)
County of Residence
Charge (most serious at court filing)
Associated Weapon Charge (indicating weapon used in
offense)
Number of Prior Arrests (logged)
Number of Arrests During Case Processing (labeled concurrent
arrests logged)
Prior Incarceration
Warrant Issued During Sample Case
Detained During Case Processing
Case Processing Time (months)
New Jersey (Juvenile Court) or New York (Criminal Court)

Dependent Variables

To compare punishments in juvenile and criminal court, we examine three dependent
variables: detention during case processing, disposition, and length of incarceration for those
sentenced to jail or prison.
Pretrial detention is an important predictor of future court outcomes89 and a substantive
punishment on its own. 90 Defendants who are remanded pretrial may be more likely to plead
guilty in order to either gain immediate freedom from jail or to begin receiving credit for their
time spent in custody. 91 We use a dichotomous measure to indicate whether the defendant was
detained at any point between court filing or initial hearing and sentencing or final disposition.
To reconcile procedural differences and disparities among dispositional categories across the
two court jurisdictions, we constructed a four-level categorical variable rather than a dichotomous
variable indicating conviction. For example, both jurisdictions offer a similar disposition, titled
"adjourned in contemplation of dismissal" in New York and "adjourned disposition" in New
Jersey, in which cases are monitored for six to twelve months and dropped with no further court
action if the defendant is not re-arrested. To be eligible for this, however, a defendant must plead
guilty and, hence, be convicted in New Jersey, but not so in New York where a defendant is still
considered innocent when this disposition is ordered. The categorical variable used here groups
similar dispositions that may have different official classifications regarding the convicted versus
not convicted dichotomy. The resultant variable includes the following categories: not convicted
or diverted from court; given a review period (such as being adjourned in contemplation of
dismissal); convicted and given a fine, probation, or alternative to detention; and incarceration.
Custodial sentence length among New Jersey cases was computed from actual release dates
from the records of the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission. We estimated custodial
89

See M.A.

BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT

case outcomes).

31 (1982) (describing the causal effect of detention on juvenile court

D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66-68 (1972); MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
205-06 (1979).
91 Often defendants detained pretrial are incarcerated for long terms, and this time may not count toward their
90

JONATHAN

PUNISHMENT

eventual prison sentences.
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sentence lengths for New York cases as two-thirds of the maximum sentence given by the
sentencing judge. This estimate was based on research by the New York City Criminal Justice
Agency (the agency by whom the sentencing data were supplied) confirming its general
applicability. 92
C.

DATA ANALYTIC STRATEGY

To examine differences in the use of detention, we first present detention rates by state and
stratified by prior arrest record and arrest charge. Next, we estimate three logistic regression
equations of detention, controlling for several other factors. We use logistic regression because
the dependent variable is dichotomous.93 The first regression equation includes all relevant
independent variables; the second model adds interaction terms of state by each arrest charge 94 to
test if the charge differences have state-specific effects. The third model is restricted to robbery
cases, in order to limit our comparisons to a smaller group of more homogenous and noteworthy
cases.
We use a similar strategy to estimate differences by state in dispositions. We present
differences between states in dispositions and stratified by arrest charge and prior record. Then
we estimate a Heckman two-stage probit regression equation on the likelihood of incarceration to
determine whether state predicts incarceration when controlling for all other independent
variables. Heckman two-stage models are used because any model predicting sentencing
practices includes a censored sample, in that only convicted cases are included in models with
sentencing as the dependent variable. 95 The Heckman two-stage model produces parameter
estimates that take into account censoring for those cases where there was no finding of guilt or
delinquency. In the two-stage model, a censoring parameter is estimated and then incorporated
into the probit analysis of the dependent variable. 96 Probit analyses are used because the
dependent variable is dichotomous. 97 The models include a robust cluster by county that adjusts
the standard error of each coefficient to account for any systematic differences among cases from
each of the six included counties. 98 As we did with the detention analyses, we estimate three
multivariate models predicting incarceration: a full sample model with no interaction terms, a
full sample model with interaction terms of state by arrest charge (one for state by burglary, and
one for state by aggravated assault), and a model including only robbery cases.

92

MARY T. PHILLIPS ET AL., ESTIMATING DISPLACEMENT FOR ALTERNATIVE-TO-INCARCERATION

PROGRAMS IN NEW

YORK CITY (2002).
93 G.S. MADDALA, LIMITED-DEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS

13, 22-27 (1983).
94 We include two interaction terms: state X aggravated assault charge and state Xburglary charge. Robbery charges
are excluded as a contrast variable, as is appropriate when working with a series of dummy variables.
95 RICHARD BREEN, REGRESSION MODELS: CENSORED, SAMPLE SELECTED, OR TRUNCATED DATA 2-11 (1996); Richard
A. Berk, An Introduction to Sample Selection Bias in Sociological Data, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 386, 393-97 (1983)

(discussing corrections for sampling bias in sociological data).

96 There is some debate over whether to correct for sample selection.

See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC

ANALYSIS 983 (4th ed. 2000). This paper corrects for sample selection because conviction decisions may be based on
quality of evidence rather than on other factors related to sentencing. See, e.g., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FELONY
ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION INNEW YORK CITY'S COURTS 75-76 (1977). Thus the question of what

factors predict incarceration is relevant for the entire sample of arrestees, as it tells us what factors lead to incarceration
regardless of the factors that lead to conviction. By correcting for a truncated sample, the results can be generalized to
the entire sample and not just to the portion of the sample that resulted in conviction. In addition, most research on
court sentencing has used the two-stage sample selection bias correction method or variations thereof. See, e.g.,
JEFFERY T. ULMER, SOCIAL WORLDS OF SENTENCING 43 (1997); Steffensmeier & Demuth, supra note 88, at 713-15.
97 See generally MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS (2d ed. 2001); GREENE, supra note

96, at 878-79; PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 906-911 (1993). All the Heckman two-stage models are
performed in STATA 7 statistical package. Other analyses are performed in SPSS 10.0.
Only the results of the second stage of the Heckman two-stage model are reported: the prediction of a custodial

sentence.
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Our comparison of sentence lengths is somewhat more constrained than the previous two
comparisons. Because the statutes guiding custodial sentence lengths in each state are different
from one another, it would be meaningless to model this as a dependent variable in a multivariate
model. Thus, we graphically display the relative distribution of sentences in each state, among
cases that resulted in incarceration. We present the percentages of incarcerated cases falling into
each sentence length category rather than the actual number of cases in each category. This is
due to the greater number of incarcerated cases in New York; as a result, the frequencies of
sentences are on different scales in the two states and need to be adjusted to show relative
distributions. For ease of comparison, we group the sentence length values into ranges that allow
for a more coherent graphical presentation.
III. RESULTS
A.

DETENTION

Table 5 displays the numbers and percentages of cases detained overall by state, by arrest
charge within each state, and by prior arrest record within each state. Overall, detention rates are
higher in the criminal court cases in New York compared to the juvenile court cases in New
Jersey (47.1% versus 41.4%, respectively). Detention rates are comparable for robbery cases but
differ by state for burglary and assault cases. Detention rates for youth with prior records are
similar across states. The likelihood of being detained is augmented by a prior record in both
states, and the disparity between the overall state detention rates remains when splitting the
sample into those with and without prior records.
TABLE 5: DETENTION BY STATE, CHARGE, AND PRIOR ARREST RECORD

Overall
By Arrest Charge:
Robbery Cases
Aggravated Assault Cases
Burglary Cases
By Presence of Prior Arrest Record:
No Prior Record
Prior Arrest Record

New Jersey
%
n
439
41.4

New York
%
n
47.1
622

138
182
119

51.1
39.5
36.1

536
59
27

50.5
29.4
45.8

71
368

20.3
51.8

232
390

31.9
65.7

These results suggest that arrest charge and prior record are important predictors of pretrial
detention, as is jurisdiction. To control for offense and offender characteristics that influence
detention, we estimate logistic regression models with all predictors included. Model 1 in Table
6 shows that variables related to the severity of current offense and the offender's prior record are
significant predictors of detention. These variables include weapon charge, arrest warrant, prior
arrests, concurrent arrests, and a history of incarceration. Both burglary and aggravated assault
cases are less likely to be detained than robbery cases. We control for offender demographic
characteristics, several of which are significant: males are more likely to be detained than
females, and whites less likely than African Americans, after controlling for all other variables.
After controlling for offense and offender characteristics, cases originating in the criminal court
in New York are significantly more likely to be detained.
We next include two interaction terms to examine whether specific charges were more or
likely
to result in detention within states, and re-estimated this model. Model 2 in Table 6
less
shows that the results are unchanged by the addition of the two interaction terms. The two
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interaction terms do not significantly improve the model's fit, and neither one is a significant
predictor on its own. Finally, we estimate separate regression models for each of the three
offense categories. Model 3 in Table 6 shows results for robbery, the largest offense category.
The coefficient for state is positive in all three of these offense-specific models, though at varying
levels of significance. 99 This pattern of results, after controlling for all other offense and offender
factors, again shows that New York criminal courts are more likely to detain defendants pretrial.
In sum, we find that detention is reserved for more serious cases and cases with defendants
of lengthy prior offending histories, that females and whites are less likely to be detained than
males or any racial minorities, and that prosecution in New York criminal court leads to a greater
likelihood of detention relative to prosecution in New Jersey juvenile court. Thus, with regard to
"front-end" punishment at this first stage of case processing, we find a leniency gap between
juvenile and criminal courts.
TABLE 6: LOGISTIc REGRESSION ON DETENTION
Model 1
Main Effects
B
Exp (B)
Age
Sex (Contrast = Female)
Ethnicity (Contrast = African Am.)
White
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity
Current Charge (Contrast = Robbery)
Burglary
Aggravated Assault
Associated Weapon Charge
Arrest Warrant
Number of Prior Arrests (logged)
Number of Concurrent Arrests
(logged)
History of Incarceration
Case Length (in days, logged)
State (Contrast = New Jersey)

Chi-Square
:(Chi-Square)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

B.

Model 3
Robbery Only
B
Exp (B)

-0.002
0.509**

0.998
1.663

0.006
0.520"'

1.006
1.682

0.021
0.826"**

1.021
2.284

.0.745
-0.060
0.031

0.475
0.942
1.032

-0.730
-0.062
0.021

o*

0.482
0.940
1.021

-0.354
0.024
0.009

0.702
1.025
1.010

-0.431
-0.881
0.975

-0.298
-0.918
0.969
0.419"*
0.881

0.742
0.399
2.635
1.521
2.414

1.075

0.883

0.650
0.414
2.651
1.518
2.418

0.892

2.929
1.115
2.440

0.705
0.939
0.008
0.436

2.024
2.556
1.008
1.546

0.704
0.930"
0.008
0.459**

2.023
2.535
1.008
1.583

0.496"
0.931
0.024'
0.484 *

1.643
2.536
1.024
1.622

0.204
-0.335

1.227
0.715

0.418"*

State X Burglary Charge
State X Aggravated Assault Charge
-onstant
Log Likelihood

Model 2
Interactions
B
Exp (B)

-2.321
2638.01
0
617.866
0.000

0.109

-2.506
2635.461

-3.159
1553.959

620.416
0.000

306.847
0.000

DISPOSITION

Table 7 compares four categories of dispositions across the two states: not convicted or
diverted from court; given a review period (such as being acquitted in contemplation of
Results of the aggravated assault and burglary models are available on request. In sum, the "state" factor was
highly significant among robbery cases (p = 0.006), moderately significant for burglary cases (p = 0.046), and not
statistically significant for aggravated assault cases (p = 0.276).
99
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dismissal); convicted and given a fine, probation, or alternative to detention; and incarceration.' 00
About four in ten cases in each state are not convicted, either by dismissal, acquittal, or diversion
from court prior to any disposition. This is fairly consistent for each type of arrest charge.
There are substantial state-level differences among results for the other three disposition
categories. New Jersey juvenile courts are more likely than New York criminal courts to impose
either a review period or a non-custodial sanction. Youth in the criminal courts in New York are
more likely to be incarcerated overall and for each offense category.' 0' Youth charged with
burglary in New York are nearly seven times more likely to be incarcerated compared to youth
charged with burglary in New Jersey. These differences occur despite the reverse waiver
York that resulted in the return of 146 (23%) defendants to the Family Court
provisions in New
02
for sentencing. 1
Table 7 shows that sanction certainty is no greater in the criminal court compared to the
juvenile court. But the severity of punishment-specifically, the use of incarceration compared
to less restrictive forms of punishment-is far greater in the criminal court. Courts in New York
are more likely to impose custodial sanctions relative to periods of non-custodial supervision or
community sentences. Once again, the criminal courts appear to be far more punitive.
TABLE 7: CONVICTION AND SENTENCING BY STATE AND CHARGE

Fine - ATD -

Not Convicted,

or Diverted
NJ
NY
%

%

All Cases

39.1

By Arrest Charge
Robbery Cases
Aggravated Assault Cases
Burglary Cases

40.0
44.9
30.6

Review Period
NJ
NY
%

%

39.2

15.1

38.0
47.7
32.7

14.9
15.0
15.5

Probation
NJ
NY
%

%

11.2

37.9

8.8
23.3
14.3

33.7
31.8
49.5

Incarceration
NJ
NY
%

4%

25.8

7.9

23.8

27.1
18.8
24.5

11.4
8.4
4.4

26.1
10.2
28.6

We test these results with a Heckman two-stage probit regression on likelihood of
incarceration among those who are convicted. As Model 1 in Table 8 displays, several variables
predict increased likelihood of incarceration. Most of the variables relating to offense severity
and severity of prior record are significant. Specifically, incarceration is more likely when there
is an associated weapon charge, the defendant has a longer record of prior arrests, there are
concurrent arrests, the defendant has previously been incarcerated, or the defendant was detained
during the course of adjudication. In addition, adolescents arrested for aggravated assault and for
burglary are less likely to be incarcerated than those arrested for robbery. The coefficient for
state was positive and significant; controlling for all other factors, prosecution in New York
criminal courts leads to a greater likelihood of incarceration than prosecution in New Jersey
juvenile courts.
Model 2 in Table 8 adds two interaction terms to Model 1: state and arrest charge category
100 We include cases not convicted as a dispositional category. See Part III for an explanation of the construction of

this measure.
101 The only divergent arrest charge category is aggravated assault. Contrary to results for the other charge categories,
New York criminal courts are somewhat more likely than New Jersey juvenile courts to impose a review period on
assault cases and not to convict; however, consistent with the other results, New York is still somewhat more likely

than New Jersey to incarcerate assault cases.
102 See

supra text accompanying note 84 concerning selection bias of fifteen-year-olds.
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(state X aggravated assault and state X burglary, with robbery excluded as a contrast variable).
Though one of these interaction terms (state as a function of a burglary charge) is a significant
predictor of incarceration, adding them to the model fails to improve the model fit (p > 0.10).
Thus, the interaction terms do not enhance our ability to predict incarceration over a main effects
model.'0 3
Model 3 returns to the main effects analysis but includes only robbery cases to eliminate the
effect of different charge distributions in the two states. Overall, the results of Model 3 mirror
those of Model 1, suggesting that similar factors shape the decision to incarcerate for robbery
cases and for the entire sample. In both models, the best predictors of incarceration are state, a
history of incarceration, and arrests during case processing (concurrent arrests). Coefficients for
sex and age variables also attain significance in Model 3, but their effects are only marginally
larger than in Model 1.
TABLE 8: HECKMAN Two-STAGE CENSORED PROBIT REGRESSION OF INCARCERATION
BY OFFENSE, OFFENDER, AND JURISDICTIONAL FACTORS

Age
Sex (Contrast = Female)
Ethnicity (Contrast = African Am.)
White
Hispanic
Other Ethnicity
Current Charge (Contrast = Robbery)
Aggravated Assault
Burglary
Associated Weapon Charge
Arrest Warrant
Number of Prior Arrests (logged)
Number of Concurrent Arrests
(logged)
History of Incarceration
Case Length (in months)
Detained
State (Contrast = New Jersey)

Model 1
Main Effects
B
+
-0.069
-1.69
0.285
1.71

Model 2
Interactions
-0.075
0.293

-1.72
1.68

-0.104
0.064
-0.069

-0.87
0.65
-0.41

-0.079
0.060
-0.077

-0.63
0.60
-0.45

0.282
0.024
-0.121

0.90
0.15
-0.66

-0.176
-0.319
0.248*
0.114
0.177"

-2.03
-2.10
3.09
1.08
2.08

-0.228
-0.193'
0.243
0.135
0.189"

-2.67
-2.34
2.91
1.15
1.99

0.251'
0.313
0.127

2.12
1.53
2.77

0.281
0.954
0.005
0.534"
1.109

5.36
7.38
0.82
2.19
8.07

0.289"'
0.947
0.003
0.563
1.149

4.93
7.74
0.55
2.19
7.55

0.328
0.978
0.006
0.689
1.082

3.32
9.34
0.88
1.81
4.83

-0.136
0.621

-0.67
3.19

State X Aggravated Assault
State X Burglary
Constant
Loa-likelihood
*p <0.05, **p <0.01, ***p < 0.001

-1.855
-1942.769

4-

-1.864
-1939.465

Model 3
Robbery Only
B
z
-0.125
-2.00
0.470
1.98

-1.276
-1175.073
I

103 A separate model was also estimated using an interaction term of state by number
of prior arrests. The addition of
this variable did improve the model fit, though the results were not robust. Results in a related paper, using similar
data, demonstrate a lack of significance for a set of variables including state by prior arrests despite significance for this
individual variable. Aaron Kupchik, Legal Rationality and Jurisdictional Transfer: Comparing Sentencing of
Adolescents in Juvenile and Criminal Courts (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law and Policy
Review). Thus, prior record may have a different impact in the two states, but this does not appear to be robust.
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SENTENCE LENGTH

We continue by considering sentence lengths for those who are sentenced to prison in each
state. On average, prison sentences in New York are significantly longer than prison sentences in
New Jersey; the average sentence is 26.6 months in New York, and 18.7 months in New Jersey.
This difference is statistically significant, as demonstrated by a t-test (p < 0.05).
FIGURE 1: PRISON SENTENCE LENGTH RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION, BY STATE
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Figure 1 clearly shows that custodial sentence lengths have very different relative
distributions in the two states. The results indicate that adolescents incarcerated in New Jersey
are more likely to receive a shorter prison sentence than adolescents incarcerated in New York.
The New Jersey cases show a unimodal, positively skewed distribution. Most defendants
receive sentences of less than eighteen months. The cases at the high end of this distribution are
the few New Jersey cases that are waived to criminal court and convicted there (n = 10).104 Thus
most adolescents incarcerated in New Jersey's juvenile courts receive relatively short prison
sentences. The New York distribution is more complicated than that of New Jersey, as it shows
three distinct peaks instead of one. The first peak is similar to that of the New Jersey distribution
and shows a concentration of short sentences.10 5 The second peak occurs when the New Jersey
distribution tails off, at around twenty-four to thirty-six months. The third peak is at forty-eight
to sixty months. To investigate why cases clustered in these three peaks, we looked for
relationships among several factors; however, this cluster could not be explained by defendant's
age, the court in which the sentencing occurred (criminal, supreme, or family), or severity of
offense charge at conviction (tables not shown). 106 Further research should investigate the factors
104 Fagan, Separatingthe Men from the Boys, supranote 55, at 243.
05 This may reflect jail sentences of up to one year, the result of plea bargains reducing conviction charges to
misdemeanors where incarceration is capped at one year.
106We also tested for a relationship here between sentence length and Youthful Offender status. Youthful Offender
status is an official sentencing option for adolescents in the New York criminal courts. N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:4A-24(c).
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that influence custodial sentence lengths for adolescents in criminal courts.
In this third dimension of punitiveness, as in the two others, adolescent offenders charged in
criminal court jurisdiction receive harsher punishments. Once again, there is evidence of more
conservative allocation of punishment for adolescent felony offenders in the juvenile court.
V.

CONCLUSION

Using a natural experiment, we compare matched samples of cases adjudicated in juvenile
versus criminal courts across two jurisdictions with disparate thresholds for criminal court
culpability. To determine whether juvenile transfer policies meet their stated goals of providing
more severe punishments for adolescents than would be imposed by juvenile courts, we test
whether there is a leniency gap between these two jurisdictions. The results show that across
three dimensions, criminal courts are in fact consistently more punitive. Adolescents in criminal
court are more likely to be detained pretrial, more likely to be incarcerated, and, if incarcerated,
more likely to be sentenced to longer prison terms than similarly situated adolescents in juvenile
court. Thus, the punishments for comparable adolescents in the two types of courts are
consistently and significantly greater in criminal court than in juvenile court. The overall
incarceration rate in criminal court is almost three times as great as the rate in juvenile court and
is almost seven times as great for burglary cases in juvenile court. Thus, a very wide leniency
gap separates juvenile and criminal courts.
Several factors may contribute to the greater punitiveness of criminal courts for adolescent
offenders. The most likely is simply the statutory goal of each court and the jurisprudential
norms expressed by these statutory goals. Most juvenile courts, including those in New Jersey,
have a dual mission of rehabilitation and punishment, 10 7 yet criminal courts emphasize retribution
and community protection. Without an explicit and formal goal of rehabilitation, it is not
surprising that criminal courts are more likely to detain, convict, and incarcerate youth; it is also
not surprising that, once youth are convicted, criminal courts are more likely to sentence them to
longer prison terms. Another factor contributing to punitiveness in the criminal courts is the
limited availability of non-custodial or treatment-oriented sentencing options, a reflection both of
the disparity between the two courts' sentencing goals and the narrowly defined sentencing goals
in most states' criminal codes.
Though our research confirms that transfer to criminal court results in harsh punishment, the
08
differential effects of this policy are seemingly less extensive than intended by policy-makers.1
Given the relentless and urgent demands for increased punishment for adolescents-typified by
laws such as California's Proposition 21-it may be surprising to some that fewer than one in
four criminal court cases in our sample resulted in incarceration. This incarceration rate, though
far greater than in the juvenile courts we studied, is significantly lower than one might expect
given the political rhetoric surrounding the enactment of transfer policies. 10 9 This result may
reflect enduring adherences to a child-saver ideology and to the common law principles of
diminished capacity and individualized justice for youth that survive transfer to criminal court.
The diversity of sentencing of adolescents by criminal court judges suggests that many treat
adolescent defendants as children in need of guidance rather than adult-like offenders. This
If designated with this status, the defendant's case is sealed and sentences are limited to four years of incarceration, yet
the bivariate relationship between Youthful Offender status and sentencing failed to account for the clustering of
sentence lengths.
107 In addition to rehabilitation, juvenile courts in the United States were also founded on the principle
of avoiding the
personal and social stigma of conviction and punishment as an adult. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, The Common
Thread. Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 142 (Margaret K.
Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (discussing historic and modem theories, methods, and justifications of juvenile justice).
108 See SINGER, supranote 3, at 59-74.
109 See generally Guttman, supra note 14; Klein, supra note 14; Simon, supra note 14.
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diversity of sentencing is made possible in New York criminal courts by laws that allow judges to
circumvent sentencing guidelines and give reduced sentences to certain youth.°10
Although a "leniency gap" is evident in the severity of punishment between juvenile and
criminal court, it is possible that principles of "juvenile justice"-diminished culpability, the
possibility of developmental correction and desistance-are reproduced within the criminal
courts.'
To test this possibility, sentencing research should compare the criteria that juvenile
and criminal court judges apply in sentencing adolescents. This research should determine the
dimensions and thresholds of culpability to which adolescent defendants actually are held in
criminal courts and the extent to which criminal court decision-makers consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor. Moreover, future research should study the construction of institutional
mechanisms to preserve a child-saver ideology within a harsher and potentially more actuarial
context of criminal court." 2 Such studies should examine whether and how the childhood
"discount" survives the jurisdictional transfer to criminal court. That is, with respect to
punitiveness toward serious adolescent offenders, juvenile and criminal courts should be
compared on their own merits and not by unidimensional categorical labels as either "juvenile" or
''criminal" court.
Juvenile courts embody the common law principles of reduced culpability for adolescents
who commit crimes. Yet in the past few decades, we have seen a proliferation of policies
mandating that increased numbers of adolescents be denied the benefit of a traditionally more
rehabilitative juvenile court and held fully accountable for crimes in criminal court. Our research
shows that criminal courts to which these adolescents are transferred are indeed more punitive
than juvenile courts; however, despite the attempts to weaken the principle of reduced culpability
for adolescents, the resilience of common law doctrine of diminished responsibility in childhood
has animated organizational adaptations and the creative exercise of discretion that seem to
contradict popular efforts to criminalize adolescent offenders." I3 These developments suggest
that the century-long embrace of the common law doctrine of childhood is not about to go away
any time soon in American law.

110 New York's Youthful Offender Law allows for reduced sentences and judicial discretion in making sentencing
decisions for certain youth under age eighteen. See discussion, supra note 62.
111 See Singer et al., supra note 60 (finding that New York City youth courts reproduce juvenile justice in adult court
by holding a small proportion of eligible offenders accountable to the extent allowed by law, and by creating
specialized courts for dealing with adolescents).
1 2 See generally Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 217 (2001) (discussing the evolution and actuarial nature of America's penal policies).
113 The highly publicized conviction of thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Abraham on first-degree murder charges in
Michigan in 1999 and his later sentencing to treatment in a secure facility in Michigan's juvenile justice system
illustrates the tensions and competing normative strains inherent in the movement to criminalize delinquency and to
allocate punishments to adolescents convicted under these laws. Despite the fact that Nathaniel "was officially
assessed as functioning at the level of a six-year-old, both intellectually and emotionally," prosecutors charged him as
an adult for first-degree murder on the basis that he was capable of forming the requisite intent. He was the youngest
person ever to stand trial for murder in the United States. Keith Bradsher, Michigan Boy Who Killed at 11 Is Convicted
of Murder as Adult, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at Al. His conviction as an adult illustrates the tendency of
prosecutors to respond to the severity of the offense instead of the developmental or therapeutic needs of juvenile
offenders. Nathaniel was found guilty of second-degree murder by a jury, but the judge exercised the discretion under
Michigan law to sentence Nathaniel to a juvenile detention center rather than a prison. See Deanna M. Maher,
Michigan Juveniles Are Denied Equal Defenses Before the Law: The State of Michigan's Reaction to Juvenile
Defendants, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 259, 260 (2001) (finding the judge was able to exercise this discretion because
Nathaniel was under the age of fourteen when he committed the alleged offense; however, Nathaniel was placed in the
maximum security program at Maxey Boys Training Center, a program that was established for "older, violent
offenders"). For alternatives to waiving juveniles to adult court, see Christina DeJong & Eve Schwitzer Merrill,
Getting "Tough on Crime": Juvenile Waiver and the Criminal Court, 27 OHION.U. L. REv. 175 (2001).
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